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Legal  Fictions:  Constituting  Race,  Composing  Literature is  an
intriguing addition to  Karla  Holloway’s  distinguished body of  work in
African-American  Studies.  While  Holloway’s  classic  Moorings  and
Metaphors (1992) demonstrated her firm grasp of an extensive array of
critical  vocabularies  from  linguistics  to  mythography,  Legal  Fictions
focuses more closely on the interconnection of U.S. law, the construction
of racial identities, and African-American literature, thereby contributing
an approving stance on the occasionally contested legitimacy of the “Law
and Literature” movement. Holloway’s latest book weaves interpretations
of  U.S.  jurisprudence  into  illuminating  readings  of  African-American
literature from William Wells Brown to Walter Mosley. In this dense and
concise monograph, Holloway’s main intention is not only to demonstrate
that racial identities in the United States were shaped by U.S. law, but
also to catalogue a set of recurrent figures, both formal and discursive,
anchoring African-American literature in a protracted debate with its own
legal origin stories and jurisprudential underpinnings: “Black literatures
are legal fictions inevitably bound by law” (62). 
2
Legal Fictions is divided into three chapters, each corresponding
to  one  of  the  main  segments  of  U.S.  jurisprudence:  property  law,
evidentiary law, and contract law. In the course of the first chapter (“The
Claims of  Property:  On Being and Belonging”),  Holloway retraces the
paradoxes at the heart of African-American legal personhood since its
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nullification  during  slavery.  In  the  course  of  an  astute  discussion  of
Charles  Johnson’s  novel  Middle  Passage (1990),  Holloway  details  the
“tantalizingly  vague”  (28)  constructions  of  property,  citizenship  and
personhood  in  U.S.  law.  Rutherford  Calhoun,  the  main  character  in
Johnson’s  novel,  has  received  from his  dying  master  the  papers  that
might eventually confer on him the status of a freed man, yet the legal
premises of his impending liberation are circular: “a deathbed gift […] is,
by the traditions of  English common laws that were the basis of  U.S.
jurisprudence, legally inalienable. And yet, to make Rutherford a gift of
himself would also establish him as a legal person, able to receive an
inalienable gift, even though there was a constitutional clause that denied
him  the  citizenship  that  attends  personhood”(28).  It  is  Holloway’s
strongest  merit  in  this  chapter  to  consider  both  the  ambiguities  of
African-American  legal  personhood  during  slavery  and  the  univocal,
definite violence that has steadily derived from these very ambiguities. 
3
The second chapter of Legal Fictions slightly weakens this careful
balancing  act.  Engaging  with  the  role  played  by  African-American
“corporealities” in U.S. evidentiary law, Holloway begins by encapsulating
her  core  thesis  in  a  shrewd  aphorism:  “[…]  property  could  not  give
evidence — they could only be evidence” (58); “they” evoking the always
collective objectification  derived  from  any  body  of  law  inscribing
whiteness as a property and as a prerequisite for full  access to legal
personhood. Drawing upon the Antelope case and the Amistad case, in
which a rebellion aboard the eponymous slave ship led to a notorious
legal debate between Spain and the U.S. government, Holloway argues
that the “two legal cases have all the markings of a postmodern fiction —
characters exchanging places between persons and things, language so
convoluted and names so easily dropped and replaced that identity seems
a free-floating signifying question with a critical and necessary propensity
for shape-shifting” (58). This reviewer would like to suggest that while it
is  undoubtedly true that  the postmodern text’s  “propensity for shape-
shifting” has encouraged strategic reconfigurations of African-American
identity and literary politics, the academic heritage of postmodernism has
arguably  overshadowed  another decisive  contribution  of  African-
American poetics to world literature:  the development of  a poetics of
unambiguousness,  taking its  roots precisely in the kind of  testimonial
discourses Holloway calls into play, and aiming at the literary recreation
of a “speech that all mankind practically and readily understand”.i
4 Holloway also seems reluctant to elaborate on a few of the central terms
in  her  study.  Consider  the  following  sentence:  “Coleridge,  with  an
ideology clearly influenced by Kant, explained the differences between
the  imagination  and  fancy  by  exposing  the  associative  relationship
between the two” (66). Holloway then quotes from Biographia Literaria,
and  returns  to  her  commentary  with  an  elliptical  conclusion:  “Fancy
becomes the formal version of natural law.” This reviewer could not help
wondering about  the  function  of  an  argumentative  shift  such as  that
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operated by the suggestion, at no point elucidated, that Kant’s influence
on Coleridge was ideological rather than philosophical — an admittedly
debatable, and thus necessary distinction this reviewer wishes to hold on
to.  While it  is  true that  the uncovering of  the ideological  contents of
Idealism has substantially deepened our understanding both of African-
American  literatures  and  of  the  literary  field  in  the  19th century,  a
reminder of recent scholarly advances on the subject would have made
Holloway’s argument more easily accessible, and avoided a number of
potential misunderstandings —misunderstandings being all too frequently
both  the  critical  fate  and  the  epistemic  violence  of  multidisciplinary
scholarship.
5
Holloway  does  however  reflect  the  overarching  theoretical
underpinnings of her study with great subtlety. On page 31, she quotes
Fredric Jameson’s argument that “postmodernism in culture —whether
apologia  or  stigmatization—  is  also  at  one  and  the  same  time,  and
necessarily,  an implicitly or explicitly political  stance on the nature of
multinational  capitalism.”  The  loose  adequation  of  cultural
postmodernism and globalized liberal capitalism has been a familiar and,
for all practical purposes, cogent position since what has been, arguably,
the  rising tide  of  both.  Holloway pushes  the  envelope yet  further  by
implicitly suggesting that Legal Fictions could itself be understood as a
metaphorical  participant  in  the  “multinational  capitalism”  it  implicitly
both condemns and condones. Yet this ambiguity functions as a warning
to the readers of Legal Fictions rather than as a theoretical blind spot: As
Georges  Canguilhem  frequently  remarked,  the  intersection  of
“specialized”  sciences  in  multidisciplinary  studies  itself  remains
“specialized.” As a consequence, works of criticism that flaunt their multi
disciplinary epistemes are particularly prone to engage in the production
of transdiscursive capital, a capital that is valuable because it hints at the
convertibility of distinct discursive systems, yet a capital that makes this
convertibility contingent upon an ostentatious, incantatory demonstration
of  critical  vocabulary,  of  an unfortunate kind of  critical  lingua franca
combining the terminological idiosyncrasies of the systems it proposes to
disentrench  (or:  globalize)  while  combining  little  of  their  respective
explanatory  powers.  Holloway’s  text  is  mostly  exempt  from  such
demonstrations,  and often makes the reflection of  its  own theoretical
premises a constitutive part of the arguments it presents. In so doing,
Holloway  points  with  remarkable  integrity  to  the  potentials  and
vulnerabilities  of  the  “Law and Literature”  research  paradigm,  which
considers  “multidisciplinarity”  itself  to  be  a  central  object  of
interrogation. 
6
If Holloway’s main thesis, according to which “Black literatures
are legal fictions inevitably bound by law,” is true —which it undoubtedly
is—, a legitimate concluding question nevertheless remains unanswered:
Why  has  African-American  literature  maintained  with  its  own  legal
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underpinnings  a  relationship  so  concealed  as  to  necessitate  the
deployment  of  such  a  complex  methodological  apparatus  in  order  to
restore some legibility to this relationship? Put another way: Why was it
the  fate  of  African-American  literaturealone,  as  distinct  from  other
African-American cultural traditions, to have to suppress and obscure its
glaring over-determination by U.S. law? 
7
Despite  these  unanswered  questions,  some  terminological
shortcomings  and  a  number  of  argumentative  mannerisms,  Karla
Holloway’s  Legal  Fictions is  a  welcome  addition  to  the  field.
Nevertheless, it should mostly garner the interest of scholars working on
subjects closely related to Holloway’s own. 
NOTES
i.  Frederick Douglass, “The Claims of the Negro Ethnologically Considered,” Selected Speeches and
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